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Abstract
We are living in an age in which digitization will connect more and more
physical assets with IT systems and where IoT endpoints will generate a wealth
of valuable data. Companies, individual users, and organizations alike therefore
have the need to control their own physical or non-physical assets and data sources.
At the same time, they recognize the need for, and opportunity to, share access
to such data and digitized physical assets. This paper sets out our technology
vision for such sharing ecosystems, reports initial work in that direction, identifies
challenges for realizing this vision, and seeks feedback and collaboration from the
academic access-control community in that R&D space.
Keywords: FROST Language, Policy Life Cycle, Software Development
Kit, Belnap Logic, Distributed Ledger.
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1 Introduction
There is little doubt that the increased digitization of our physical and social world has
already had profound impact – economically, socially, and technically. The adoption
rate of smart-phones and their increased capabilities and richness of user interactions
through apps are just one source of evidence for this claim. Digitization is also changing
the manufacturing plants and their processes, vehicle function and interaction with the
environment, and general consumer expectations of service provisions. For the latter,
progressive web apps are an example of how today’s users wish to interact with products
and services – where the ability of an app to adapt to user-specific interaction history
and needs is seen as a competitive advantage.
The increased connectedness that this digitization of our lives brings, and its shift
from product purchase to user-centric service consumption drives, in part, the creation
of nascent sharing economies. For example, throughout the globe there are a host of
providers for e-bikes, e-scooters, and cars operating locally where clients can use these
resources on demand for flexible periods of time. And with the growth rate of sales of
new cars predicted to fall to about 2 percent globally by 2030 [32], Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEM) are incentivized to find means of increasing the monetary value
of a manufactured vehicle. One way in which an OEM can do this is to not sell the
car at all, but rather operate a service by which the car can be used by many, thus
increasing the active usage time and the revenue stream generated by usage of the
vehicle.
The sharing economy is not limited to the consideration of Business-To-Consumer
(B2C) business models. A decentralized app for accommodation sharing, e.g., may
enable Consumer-To-Consumer (C2C) business models for the sharing of rooms, apart-
ments or other facilities such that clients can directly formulate the access conditions
to their own data and physical resources without a central organization having already
access to such data and resources.1 Such an approach requires, though, that clients
as owners of physical resources can freely delegate the access of their own resources to
others – under specific conditions that typically include or trigger financial transactions.
Of course, the sharing economy is neither confined to mobility and transportation
nor to B2C and C2C business models. A typical Business-To-Business (B2B) case is
found in ecosystems in which companies already have established working relationships
and work-flows across organizations. Generally, such an ecosystem lacks the technical
means of judiciously sharing access to physical resources, data or data-driven insights
across organizational boundaries in a digital, fine-grained, and (semi)-automated man-
ner.
This gap presents a business opportunity as the provision of such digital sharing pro-
cesses can reduce cost (e.g. removal of manual data entry on the receiving end), improve
security (e.g. prevention of ad-hoc data sharing such as through email attachments),
1The governance of this platform would be exercised by some parties that would hold power over
running that platform, but that should not enable these parties to circumvent access controls that
operate within that platform itself.
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and create economic value (e.g. by leasing under-utilized physical resources).
For example, a company that operates train infrastructure may want to share some
data sets with a train manufacturer, and share different data sets and access to physical
devices deployed on tracks with a service company that maintains these tracks. But
even if these parties had already understood the specifics of what should be shared
with whom under which circumstances, they would have neither the technical means
of operationalizing this understanding, nor of verifying the trustworthiness of such an
operationalization.
It is clear that a technical solution to this needs to provide sufficient interoperability.
Non-technical issues such as social, regulatory or cognitive ones also may need to be
overcome; e.g., company culture may make it hard to contemplate that there is value
in sharing data or resources with other, perhaps competing, companies. Regulation
may prevent such sharing or put demands on its operationalization and auditing. And
understanding what should be shared and exactly how and with whom can create cog-
nitive complexity that needs to be managed – regardless of what specification language
is being used for access controls.
The engagement with our clients and potential customers has made us realize that
there is a definite need for technology that can provide such owner-centric means of
sharing physical resources, data, and data-driven insights such that participating parties
can agree on the specifics of their sharing topology and its controls. The realization of
the vision we offer in this paper faces several challenges, some of which we will highlight
subsequently. The intent of this paper is to share this vision and its challenges in order
to gain feedback and to encourage collaboration on the needed research and development
(R&D) in order to make this vision a reality.
Outline of Paper Our vision and its guiding principles are the subject of Section 2.
Our work done so far towards realizing this vision is discussed in Section 3. In Sec-
tion 4, we explore some challenges that attaining this vision faces. Section 5 details
research topics in which we think the academic access-control community can make
vital contributions for our vision of sharing ecosystems. Representative related work is
summarized in Section 6 and the paper concludes in Section 7.
2 Our Vision and its Principles
We now discuss our vision by formulating its guiding principles and technical ambition,
while also explaining the values that determine these principles.
First, we observe that there is an apparent tension between centralization of service
provision and genuine control of owners over their digital or physical assets. This can
be seen, e.g., in the manner in which big tech companies such as Facebook, Apple,
Amazon, Netflix, and Google give their users only limited control over data generated
by them.
However, it is the ability to control access and to manage the life cycle of such data
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that amounts to what most of us would understand to be data ownership. In UK law,
e.g., there seems to be nothing on the Statute Books that refers to data ownership
directly but rather to the control of data. Indeed, it is unclear whether users, owners
or manufacturers (say of a car) could own a piece of data from that asset – say under
current EU law. It is therefore conceivable that Internet of Things (IoT) data may
have multiple owners. Moreover, future owners may neither be human subjects nor
legal entities – e.g. autonomous machines.
Our first principle assumes that such legal clarity of ownership and data creation
will be established in the future:
Principle 1 (Owner-Centric Data Handling). The creators of data should be in genuine
control over their data.
Note that this principle does not rule out that data owners may give away their
own data or even control over it – be it for free as a social good, for money or for some
other motive. But it does mean that the owners of such data, e.g. of sensor data from
a vehicle, are in full control of that data as soon as it gets created – and that these
owners can decide to delegate to others access of such data. We emphasize that this
applies not only to owners as individuals but equally when the owner is a legal entity
such as a limited company that hosts its data in a cloud environment but on premise.
An owner-centric approach also places great importance onto data privacy: data
controls should default to using access-control policies that protect the user, and where
deviations from defaults are at the discretion of data owners.
For physical assets, it is often said that “possession is nine-tenths of the law”. We
believe that this expression will need to be revised in the digital future, since most
physical assets of value will have micro-controllers embedded in them that guard access
to those assets and their functions based on digital credentials. This leads us to the
following principle:
Principle 2 (Owner-Centric Access to Physical Assets). The owners of physical assets
should be in control over these assets and over the ability to delegate such access controls.
This principle seems like a truism. But it should also apply when the owner is not
in physical proximity of the asset and when the owner is a legal entity (e.g. as might be
the case for a car that “owns itself”). The delegation mechanism stated in this principle
gives rise to social and technical complexity, manifesting itself in two types: delegation
of
• basic access rights such as “my daughter may use my Porsche on weekends before
8pm”,
• specifying entire access-control policies, e.g. when the OEM would say that “this
car dealer may install and run an access-control policy on that vehicle as well".
Transfer of ownership may be seen as a special case of that second type of delegation.
In the future, the OEM will certainly want to maintain a numerical passport of the
vehicle it manufactured, e.g. in order to do predictive maintenance and to improve
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future versions of that particular car model. But such access to data needs to be
consistent with whatever policy the car dealer, e.g. as legal owner of the car, would
want to put onto the vehicle. Similarly, the policy of a leaseholder (to whom the car
dealer may have delegated the right to install such a policy on the vehicle) would need
to be consistent with that of the car dealer and with the one of the OEM. This leads
us to another principle:
Principle 3 (Programmable Sharing Ecosystem). Technology should enable the expres-
sion of delegation and access relationships that are consistent with each other and reflect
the needs of owners and consumers of data and other assets.
Let us explore this principle in a case in which two companies (X and Y) want to
share access to data sets about driving behavior over their own vehicle models. They
have an incentive to share the knowledge that resides within such data sets, e.g. in
order to improve the quality of their machine-learning algorithms for semi-automatic
driving.
Yet companies X and Y will never agree to actually share these data sets as in a
“may read/may copy” modality that would move such data onto the other company’s
premises. But they may agree to running a machine-learning algorithm on their own
data sets on behalf of the other company and to then report back the learned math-
ematical model. The principle says that the technology should allow these companies
to leave their data sets on premise, to run machine-learning algorithms from the other
company on their own data sets, and to have a fair way of reporting those results back.
Fairness may amount to selling the model for an adequate price, to using an escrow
service if both companies expect to receive models from the other company’s data sets
or to relying on some other mutually agreed upon trust mechanism. We believe that
the “may train” modality for this use case of data access – which is weaker than “write”
and “read” – is of independent interest for the access-control community.
This principle also applies when actors share a physical resource, as our use case
of the OEM, the car dealer, and the leaseholder of a vehicle illustrated. In that use
case, the principle assures that these stakeholders have the technological means of
mapping their social or contractual understanding of access to vehicle data and function
consistently onto the vehicle technology and its communication interfaces.
That use case also demonstrates that more data will be generated from IoT end-
points, and more computation will be pushed to IoT edges. This technology trend, and
general security considerations, lead us to our next principle:
Principle 4 (Physical Proximity of Access-Control). Access-control, including the ver-
ification of both delegation and change management of controls, should be enforced close
to or embedded into the assets that are subject to these controls.
Vehicles would thus compute and enforce access-control decisions within their in-
ternal vehicle systems, potentially also with offline capabilities for communicating and
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verifying policy state. And enterprises may host a server that provides similar function-
ality in controlling access to local data sets and the reporting of data-driven insights to
external parties.
From a business perspective, there is an incentive to realize such access controls with
the same software for the micro-controller and the server environments; this would de-
crease development costs, would ease maintenance, and so forth. We therefore formulate
a principle rooted in considerations of code assurance and economics:
Principle 5 (Software is Executable on IoT and ICT). Software that can reliably realize
such access-control for both micro-controllers and servers has a competitive advantage.
The importance of this principle should not be underestimated; e.g., it rules out the
use of eXtensible Markup Language (XML) technology for building such software, since
XML is not supported or too demanding in most micro-controller environments. It also
suggests that a balance needs to be struck between the expressiveness of programming
languages running on servers and the restrictions in terms of storage and available
technology stacks and toolings found on commercial micro-controllers.
The access-control software we envision serves as an abstraction layer on top of exist-
ing controls, e.g. those within a vehicle network or in an enterprise network. Therefore,
this principle is consistent with the use of server-side technology such as eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) at lower layers of abstraction.
The use cases we described so far, Company X/Company Y and OEM, Car Dealer,
and Leaseholder, may be interpreted as closed systems in and of themselves. We prefer
to call them biotopes that may choose to connect with other such sharing biotopes
within larger sharing ecosystems, e.g. emerging data marketplaces. From a technology
perspective, this means that we also want to accommodate open sharing systems. For
example, a company that manufactures batteries may want to share battery usage data
with a provider of electric charging stations for e-scooters, and e-scooter users may
share their location data with advertisers for free battery charging – should they deem
this deal to be acceptable.
Principle 6 (Open Sharing Ecosystems). Sharing systems can connect to other sharing
systems in an open network with trustworthy consensus mechanism.
We believe that decentralized consensus architectures as found in Distributed Ledger
Technology (DLT) have good potential in this regard: important system state needs
to have consensus in order to make the system function reliably (under faults) and
resiliently (under attacks from active adversaries). Known consensus algorithms provide
such reliability and resiliency at high cost: they may not scale to desired network or
transaction size (e.g. Byzantine algorithms such as PBFT [8]), they may be proprietary
(e.g. Hashgraph at https://hedera.com) or they may be wasting energy (e.g. Proof of
Work [17, 33]). This leads us to another principle:
Principle 7 (Sustainable Technology). Sharing ecosystems should use technology that
makes these systems sustainable.
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For example, we do not believe that consuming energy at the scale of a major in-
dustrial economy is a good way of implementing consensus in an open network for
sharing ecosystems, as seems to be the case for Proof of Work in the Bitcoin cryptocur-
rency [33]. And we also do not accept that the incentive mechanisms that such open
systems typically require should lead to unfair treatment of some network participants
over others, e.g. as seen in the dynamics of mining for cryptocurrencies based on Proof
of Work – where it is no longer feasible to mine as a private citizen with standard
computing equipment. This motivates our next principle:
Principle 8 (Fair and Democratic Sharing in Open Networks). Technology should
enable a democratic and fair participation in open sharing ecosystems.
This principle is one based on values that are of a political or civic nature. It does not
mean that network participants would all be equal, but it does imply that such networks
should have transparent and fair governance structures in which network participants
may gain influence based on the good contributions they have made to that network
over time. For example, network participants may gain influence by contributing to
the creation of consensus in the network state. However, the principle is also consistent
with an open network that has primarily a commercial purpose and whose governance
and membership models were co-designed with initial commercial stakeholders.
Unlocking the economic value of such networks will certainly require sufficient in-
teroperability between IoT and ICT environments that allows for the flow of data and
data-driven insights as well as for the evaluation and enforcement of access-control
policies that regulate such flow [30, 34].
The lack of interoperability in IoT is a well recognized problem. Standardization
efforts, through national and international bodies, are under way in order to address
this issue (see e.g. the International Organization for Standardization and its Technical
Committee 307 on blockchain and distributed ledger technologies). While we applaud
such initiatives, we also recognize that it is difficult (politically and technologically) to
create a globally recognized official standard that provides such interoperability all the
way from IoT edges to ICT servers and storage environments.
Rather, we deem it to be more realistic to build lightweight software development
kits (SDK) that can be installed on servers and micro-controllers alike, so that these
SDKs become a de facto standard for connecting physical and digital infrastructures
to application programming interfaces (APIs) that facilitate data sharing, access to
physical function, and sharing of data-driven insights.
These SDKs would also allow for the specification of executable access-control
policies that can refer to existing APIs (identity management systems, distributed
databases, blockchains, standardized communication protocols, and so forth) through
an expressive and extensible attribute-based language. The idea of extending domain-
specific languages (DSL) in this manner has gained momentum in recent years, for
example with the development and successful uptake of programming languages such
as Scala [35] and Haskell [20]. These considerations suggest our next principle:
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Principle 9 (High Interoperability at Low Cost). Sharing ecosystems thrive if the
software for its supporting infrastructure is lightweight, expressive, and extensible.
Before we study challenges that a realization of our vision and its principles face, we
first describe some initial technical work we did in this larger space and how it informed
the vision set out in this paper.
3 Our Work Done so far
We now describe our past and ongoing efforts in shaping this vision with R&D partners
and in developing the FROST technology. The latter serves as a foundation for realizing
at least the first five principles above and it can play a key role in enabling the remaining
principles we set out above.
3.1 Porsche Pilot
Our in-house experts in Cybersecurity and Blockchain were selected as winners of a
competition organized by the German luxury automobile manufacturer Porsche. The
prize resulted in a pilot project to bring blockchain functionality into the modern car,
with a view of exploring what possibilities this would bring – e.g. richer user experiences,
novel services or better cybersecurity of vehicles; see e.g. [29] for a technical account of
that project.
Our team did bring blockchain functionality into a Porsche Panamera and demon-
strated not only how this approach can indeed strengthen the cybersecurity of ac-
cessing vehicles, but also how this could enable a suite of new service offerings for
Porsche customers, with the resiliency that blockchain state can offer. For example,
a car owner could delegate – through an app on a smartphone – to a designated
delivery service access to the trunk in specific contexts such as time intervals. At
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KvyF78RTj18 an illustrative video shows those pilot
outcomes.
These capabilities were brought about by integrating a Raspberry Pi into the ve-
hicle’s internal network and the delegation and access functionality was programmed
in a somewhat ad-hoc manner, given the rapid pace of the pilot project itself. Of
course, we realized at that time already that we needed a more programmable means
of articulating and enforcing such controls in the medium term.
3.2 FROST Language
It was this recognition and the lessons learned during that pilot project that made us
research policy-based access-control in the literature. One of the authors of this paper,
together with Glenn Bruns (who was at Bell Labs at the time), developed the PBel
policy-composition language based on Belnap bilattices [4, 5]. Their joint work, which
began in 2006, also showed how satisfiability checkers can be used to answer a range
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of policy analyses that can support design, change management, and composition of
policies.
This work was therefore a natural starting point for assessing suitable approaches.
There are of course many other techniques and excellent contributions to policy-based
access-control, composition of policies, and policy verification in the extent literature.
But we soon recognized that PBel and its analysis framework would offer many benefits
if adapted judiciously to the needs of the access-control infrastructure of our envisioned
sharing ecosystem. Our team then worked out these revisions, which led to the devel-
opment of the FROST language, its compiler, and its bespoke code analysis. “FROST”
stands for Flexible, Resilient, Open, Service-Enabling, and Trusted.
The FROST language expresses policies that also take on meaning over the 4-valued
Belnap lattice: grant, deny, conflict, and undef. The two additional decision values
conflict and undef were needed to adequately reflect the open nature in which policies
may be composed in such ecosystems: the former captures that there is evidence for
granting and for denying a request; the latter expresses that the policy has neither
evidence for granting nor for denying a request. We appreciate that the access-control
community has argued for the use of even more decision values, e.g. in the standard
XACML 3.0 of the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Stan-
dards. But our engagement with business partners made us move additional values and
their complexity into constraints whose truth values influence decisions by triggering
rules within policies.
Like PBel, the FROST language is rule-based and its composition primitive is a
case-statement in which guards capture decision scenarios of one or more sub-policies.
FROST is also attribute-based in that its atomic conditions are formed from relations
of attributes. The latter accommodates integration with other technology through
APIs; e.g. we have developed such an API for the Security Assertion Markup Language.
Attributes and their verification are a powerful tool. For example, an attribute subject
can resolve to a more complex meaning such as multiple agents who issue a request based
on a majority vote.2
Let us illustrate this with examples of policy and policy composition in FROST.
The policy in Figure 1 consists of a sole rule that grants the access when its condition
is true and returns undef otherwise. That condition is a conjunction of constraints
that provide mappings to the object, subject, and action of the access request and
where additional conditions such as time windows constrain that access. We note that
the semantics of these mappings is implementation-specific. For example, evaluating
whether the subject is the daughter of the owner may be done through multi-factor
authentication (live AI for face recognition, biometrics of the driver seat, and so forth).
Figure 2 shows a case-statement, a priority composition of policies P andQ. FROST
cases are of the form [guard: policy] where guard is either true or a conjunction of
2We appreciate that access-control models such as UCON [37] distinguish between subjects and
subject attributes. FROST allows the use of more abstract DSLs that compile into FROST and that
do make such distinctions.
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grant if (object == vehicle) &&
(subject == vehicle.owner.daughter) &&
(action == driveV ehicle) &&
(owner.daughter.driversLicense == valid) &&
(0900 ≤ localT ime) &&
(localT ime ≤ 2000)
Figure 1: Example FROST policy that allows the daughter of a vehicle owner to drive
that vehicle under specific conditions pertaining to time windows, valid driving license,
and potential authentication implicit in the “subject” condition
case {
[P eval conflict :deny]
[P eval undef :Q]
[true:P ]
}
Figure 2: Example policy composition specified with a case-statement: this encodes a
binary operator P >> Q where policy parameter P has priority over policy parameter
Q
expressions of form “policy eval decision” saying that policy evaluates to a decision,
an element of the set {grant,deny, conflict,undef}. The composition in Figure 2
therefore denies if P reports a conflict, returns the decision of Q if P reports undef,
and returns the decision of P in all other cases. Deep embeddings of FROST into other
languages such as Haskell would also support naming of conditions and policies, as well
as function declarations and invocations whose return types are FROST conditions or
policies.
The FROST language also accommodates obligations, in an approach similar to
one of [25]; but other obligation semantics are consistent with the FROST language as
well. We have not yet implemented obligations, but are interested in exploring their
enforcement aspects (e.g. for payments) through an open FROST network that makes
use of DLT.
Finally, a FROST policy is compiled into two Boolean circuits that capture the
4-valued decision space and whose atomic expressions are actually atomic conditions
occurring in the compiled FROST policies. It is these circuits that will be executed
in the access-control architecture, making this execution environment simple and effi-
cient enough for micro-controller environments as well. We refer to the FROST Yellow
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Paper [11] for further details.
3.3 Access-control Architecture
The access-control architecture for FROST is akin to that of XACML, making use of
policy decision points, policy enforcement points, policy administration points, policy
information points, and so forth [11].
We developed a reference client for this architecture, at present with minimal func-
tionality, that can also run in a micro-controller environment. One thing we realized in
its development is that the policy decision point can be very generic but the code for the
policy enforcement point may vary as a function of the host environment (e.g. whether
it is a micro-controller or a server or whether the decisions would be enforced in a
moving vehicle).
3.4 Delegation Chains
Our vision foresees that actors can program their own sharing ecosystem. One aspect of
that is the articulation and enforcement of a delegation graph that expresses the intent
of actors in regard to the sharing of their assets.
So far, we designed cybersecurity protocols that an asset owner can initiate in order
to build up a delegation chain of actors, where the chain starts with the asset owner and
ends with the software agent that controls access to that asset. Intermediate actors are
then permitted to submit their own policies. The overall policy executed on the asset
is the composition of these policies, but where the choice of the composition operator
is controlled by the asset owner. In FROST, we decouple syntax for conditions and
policies from syntax and semantics of delegation; this simplifies reasoning and allows
for the adoption of other approaches to delegation.
3.5 Infineon Project
We also entered a partnership with Infineon Technologies, after we demonstrated suc-
cessfully in a minimal viable product how the capabilities of the Porsche pilot could be
realized not on a Raspberry Pi but on an Electronic Control Unit that is part of the
vehicle’s product platform, an AurixTM micro-controller:
www.infineon.com/cms/en/about-infineon/press/press-releases/2018/INFATV201810-005.html
The execution of that project made us appreciate the extent and types of demands
that processing and storage constraints of micro-processors place on realizing use cases
of our vision of sharing ecosystems.
Through this partnership, we hope to be able to mature the FROST technology so
that it will become production-ready for integration in the automotive sector, where
lead times for such technology changes range from 3-5 years. A key aspect will be
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to integrate our technical approach with a de facto software standard, Autosar, for
interfacing with the internal network of vehicles.
4 Challenges for Our Vision
In this section, we outline some of the key challenges that have to be addressed in order
to realize our vision.
4.1 From Closed to Open Ecosystems
From our experience, it seems prudent to build up sharing systems and their supporting
technologies bottom-up, rather than top-down. The latter approach would first build
an entire economic platform and has then the problem of drawing parties into using
that platform as a marketplace for access to data, physical resources, and data-driven
insights.
A bottom-up approach ensures that potential users of such a platform are actively
involved in defining and shaping the technical aspects of that platform. This also seems
to be a better fit for commercial parties, since they are interested in trying this first
out in a (semi-)closed environment in order to fully control with whom to engage in
sharing interactions.
An important part of our vision is an open sharing network, populated by many
sharing biotopes that may interact with each other. One challenge faced here is to build
up a sufficient number of biotopes to allow for network effects, and that at present the
setup of a biotope requires social and technical on-boarding that should ideally be
supported with as much automation as possible.
4.2 Building a Technical Community
Almost all of our code development for FROST will be open-sourced and its license
models are meant to encourage open-source contributions so that others can freely use
such code, also for further derived Intellectual Property that they may wish to exploit
commercially.
One challenge in this is to build up a community of code developers that can make
such contributions. The Rust programming language has its own ecosystem of devel-
opers but this is still a fairly small community, which limits the amount of qualified
programmers as contributors and as potential recruitment targets. In automotive, use
of C instead of Rust is currently preferred as this makes certification and compliance
activities faster and cheaper.
We hope our Haskell-based DSL will help draw some interest from developers (and
potentially academics) at the intersection of the access-control and functional program-
ming communities.
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4.3 Geographical Dynamics
Our vision and its supporting technology are about infrastructure and, as such, are
meant to be global in reach. One challenge, certainly within Europe, is that moving
from a pilot project to a scalable production case may take 3-5 years – and in some
sectors even longer than that (e.g. automotive platforms last 10-15 years). This is a
challenge for start-ups such as XAIN AG. We therefore are keen to also engage with
partners who can integrate our technology in large production systems in 2019 or 2020
already.
4.4 Optimal Trade-offs
Access-control was invented as a means for making systems more secure. In sharing
ecosystems, security and privacy demands are certainly very important. But trade-offs
may have to be made. For example, it is not feasible to make an electronic control unit
within a car into a full node of some blockchain, as the storage and compute resources
of these devices won’t allow for this.
This means that we need to develop hybrid approaches, for example one in which
such an Electronic Control Unit only stores partial state of a blockchain that is pertinent
to its own security state. Working this out in practice, with an appropriate threat and
mitigation model, poses a challenge.
5 Engaging Academic Community
The academic community of access-control has indubitably a tremendous wealth of
knowledge, tools, and general expertise to offer in order to support the shaping and
realization of our vision. We here sketch some of the ways in which this community
may help. But we want to stress that members of that community are best placed
to come forward with ideas and proposals for how they can engage in this long-term
project. We therefore are eager to hear from that community directly about what it
thinks it could offer here.
Below, we feature some topics whose development would be of value to realizing our
vision and that we think would be of interest to that academic community:
5.1 Policy Life Cycle Management
A trusted life cycle of an access-control policy and its potential updates and retirement
are important. How this life cycle is specified and enforced can be seen as an aspect of
policy administration. We seek models for this life cycle (e.g. automata-based models
of permitted administration actions) that can be stored and executed on resource-
constrained micro-controllers as well as on enterprise servers.
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5.2 Policy Integrity
How best can we ascertain the integrity of an access-control policy, not just its prove-
nance but also its freshness? DLT solutions suggest themselves, so that integrity tags
of policies and their update history may be recorded on a distributed ledger. We have
some initial concepts in that space, using a blocktree rather than a blockchain, to reflect
that many of these policies are independent of each other and so state can be sharded
for higher scalability. This approach is based on a similar proposal for Bitcoin found at
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-March/004797.html
5.3 Policy Verification
We realize that the academic community has done a lot of work on the formal verification
of access-control policies and their administration. Here, we seek tools that make use
of such established methods and techniques, e.g. Satisfiability Modulo Theories solvers
(see e.g. [16]). We already have a good understanding of the first analyses we want
to support (e.g. dead code analysis on policies). But we certainly stand to benefit
from making use of existing tools of the community. And we think that FROST can
offer interesting formal verification problems and impact opportunities to the academic
community.
5.4 Policy Privacy
Privacy considerations are of paramount importance in many use cases. We would
welcome collaborations with the academic community to ensure that FROST can be
adapted to varying privacy needs. For example, our current delegation protocol only
hides policies of delegatees from other delegatees and not from the device that stores
and executes the composed policy. And this limited privacy guarantee is based on
encryption, which may be too weak for some use cases that require higher privacy
levels – e.g. as those associated with the “Right to be Forgotten” in the EU’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
It is clear that the academic research community has a lot to offer in understanding
which architectures for access-control and its administration can support very strict
privacy demands such as those imposed by the GDPR. As the report by the French
CNIL, found at
https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/blockchain.pdf
suggests, it is challenging to make blockchains GDPR-compliant but there seem to
be ways forward in achieving this. We are particularly interested in solutions where
blockchains (or blocktrees) manage the administrative and security state of access-
control policies and their composition, rather than managing the history of financial
transactions.
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5.5 Access-Control on a Chip
In the medium to long term, we are interested in putting such complex access-control
architectures on a chip that may host a secure database (which e.g. may store partial
blocktree state). We are therefore eager to engage with academics who offer expertise
in chip design for access-control.
5.6 App Store
Part of our vision is that others can use this sharing infrastructure in order to program
applications on top of it, and where these applications make use of the sharing mecha-
nisms of that infrastructure. For example, one could imagine an Artificial Intelligence
app that is installed in vehicles that perform local reinforcement learning but where
the models are updated across these vehicles for better accuracy and learning speed;
and where FROST would facilitate the access restrictions but also the incentives for
such sharing. We are thus also interested in what the academic community can offer
in that regard. Topics of interest here seem to be algorithmic foundations for writing
such apps, interface technology that can connect such apps with our infrastructure, user
interfaces for specifying the access controls pertinent to such an app, to name a few.
5.7 Academic Outreach
We are keen to engage with the academic community through established means. For
example, we would be prepared to organize a technical workshop dedicated to our
vision – perhaps affiliated with an established conference. We would also welcome
academics to visit our headquarters in Berlin, Germany, for a face-to-face chat about
our vision and ongoing work and possible research collaborations.
6 Related Work
In this section, we feature related work that pertains to the vision we have set out in
this paper. We group this work into four themes rather than giving a many-to-many
mapping of such work to the nine principles of our vision.
6.1 Sharing and Collaboration
First, we relate our vision to research on access-control for sharing and collaboration.
In [42], XACML is used to refine existing enterprise access-control systems so that they
allow for collaboration in distributed environments, also between different organiza-
tions. Role-based access-control is combined with attribute-based access-control in [27]
to improve the security of multi-tenant cloud environments. Multi-tenancy architec-
tures for Software as a Service can benefit from support for sub-tenancies. But this
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requires secure management of such complexity. An access-control model based on Ad-
ministrative RBAC is proposed in [51] in order to address this. In [26], key distribution
is combined with the authorization of users and a procedure for data sharing to allow
for secure data sharing without the need of a trusted third party. Open challenges for
access-control of jointly owned or shared documents are discussed in [47], a solution for
the cloud environment is presented in [46], and a data-centric cloud solution is offered
in [39]. Cross-organizational tracking of assets also is in need of access-control in or-
der to avoid unintended confidentiality leaks [23]. Access-control for the provisioning
of attributes and policies in collaborative network environments is developed in [44].
Work that uses domain knowledge and semantic relations between data and data usage,
see e.g. [36], can improve policies for sharing and their enforcement. The sound and
resilient recovery of policy state from missing attribute information, see e.g. [11, 15], is
important in sharing ecosystems. Relationship-based access-control [3, 14, 31, 43], its
policy negotiation [31], and its modelling languages [38] seem to fit well user experiences
in sharing ecosystems.
6.2 Safety, Resiliency, and Trust
Second, we discuss work regarding the aspects of safety, resiliency, and trust. Access-
control for sharing displays in a vehicle can ensure the safety of display sharing [19].
In [49], decentralized storage and blockchain technology are combined with attribute-
based encryption to provide data privacy and fine-grained access-control while avoiding
a single point of failure. Attestable trust anchors on clients can help with usage control
of data across devices [48]. Combining reputation anchors with obligation handling [2]
or with DLT mechanisms such as obligation chains [41] can make trust more resilient in
open systems. Hardware isolation of the access-control functionality from the normal
application layers, e.g. as done in [22], is of great interest for secure sharing technology.
Access-control enforcement itself carries risks that may be mitigated through run-time
tracking of risk estimates [40]. The need for access-control protection measures at differ-
ent abstraction layers of systems is well recognized (see e.g. [45]). And the increasingly
distributed and intelligent nature of connected systems brings both research challenges
and opportunities for policy-based system management [6].
6.3 Compute Constraints
Third, we discuss work pertaining to the compute constraints in IoT systems. Access-
control is an important aspect of vehicular cloud environments [21]. The challenge of
compute demands for secure access-control within vehicle systems is recognized in [50],
a fog-to-cloud architecture is proposed to address this limitation while also reducing
latency of cloud-based solutions. The Policy Machine [18] is a framework that can host
access-control enforcement with minimal code requirements, a generic mechanism, and
expressiveness for refining constraints in high-assurance domains.
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6.4 Policy Analysis and Synthesis
Fourth, we briefly relate to work on synthesis or analysis of access-control policies.
The high degree of dynamics in IoT networks may benefit from use of event-driven
policies [41] and a less static generation and enforcement of access-control policies
(e.g. through machine learning) [7]. Machine learning can help with converting nat-
ural language policies into formal access-control policies, e.g. through the identification
of attributes in [1]. Policy analysis tools can identify excessive privileges and redundan-
cies [9], establish privacy properties [12], and improve revocation schemes for delegation
chains [13].
7 Conclusions
This paper articulated our ambitious vision of technology for sharing ecosystems and
its relevance to the access-control research community. Furthermore, we discussed
exploratory and more concrete work that we already undertook towards realizing this
vision. Then we talked about several challenges that we face in bringing this vision to
fruition. We pointed out that we can benefit greatly from the broad and deep expertise
of the academic community in access-control in overcoming these challenges in the
medium to long term. We also reviewed research from the academic literature in order
to illustrate pertinent connections between that extant work and our socio-technical
vision.
As we said already, we would be very grateful for gaining any feedback on this vi-
sion, receiving any expressions of interest in research collaborations, and in obtaining
any contributions to our open-source project for the FROST access-control and infras-
tructure technology.
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